Stampa  
Codice:  
Course code:
37157
Anno accademico:
Academic year:
2011-2012
Titolo del corso:
Course title:
Industrial Organization
Modulo:  
Module:
Unico
Docente 1:
Teacher 1:
MARTINI Gianmaria
Ruolo Docente 1:
Teacher 1:
Professori Ordinari
Modalità 1:
Type 1:
Convenzionale
Docente 2:
Teacher 2:
Hanany Eran
Ruolo Docente 2:
Teacher 2:
Modalità 2:
Type 2:
Convenzionale
Docente 3:
Teacher 3:
Adler Nicole
Ruolo Docente 3:
Teacher 3:
Modalità 3:
Type 3:
Convenzionale
Settore scientifico-disciplinare:
Reference sector:
SECS-P/01 Economia politica
Anno di corso:
Year of degree course:
Primo
First
Facoltà:
Faculty:
Ingegneria
Modalità di frequenza:
Type:
Non obbligatoria
Semestre:
Semester:
1
Sottoperiodo:
Sub period:
Numero totale di crediti:
Total credits:
12.0
Carico di lavoro
Workload
Attività frontale:
Lectures:
120.0
Esercitazioni:
Applied activities:
24.0
Studio individuale:
Individual work:
0.0
Attività didattica a piccoli gruppi:
Group work:
0.0
Seminari:
Seminars:
0.0
Laboratori:
Laboratories:
0.0
TOTALE (voci sopra-elencate):
TOTAL:
144.0
Ore di lezione settimanali:
0.0
Prerequisiti:
Prerequisites:
Principles of Economics
Principles of Economics
Obiettivi formativi:
Educational goals:
Optimal choices under certainty and uncercainty, optimal contracts in presence of asymmetric information, strategic decision, production efficiency and its estimation, price differentiation adn discrimination, mergers, collusion, deterrence and predation, vertical relations.
Optimal choices under certainty and uncercainty, optimal contracts in presence of asymmetric information, strategic decision, production efficiency and its estimation, price differentiation adn discrimination, mergers, collusion, deterrence and predation, vertical relations.
Contenuto del corso:
Course contents:
Part A. Optimal Choice and Game Theory. The first part covers the determinants of the single agent’s rational choice under different scenarios: the optimal individual choice under full information, under uncertainty and in the context of agency theory (the design of an optimal contract in a principal – agent model with applications to the insurance and labor markets). The second part presents the optimal behavior in a strategic context, dealing with the main applications of Game Theory to Economics. Static and Dynamic Games under complete and incomplete information are investigated, with different solution concepts (iterated dominance, Nash equilibrium, refinements of Nash equilibrium) and applications to firms behavior in oligopolistic markets. Part B. Firms Strategic Behavior The Course analyzes the strategies that firms with market power may adopt in order to maximize the returns on business investments. The topics range from pricing decisions (consumers’ discrimination, bundling and tie-in-sales), to firms’ leadership, anti-competitive behavior (collusion, entry deterrence and firms’ mergers and/or acquisitions) and antitrust economics. Non price base competition is also investigated, with application to vertical relation between firms (e.g., manufacturers’ and retailers’ contracts), advertising and product differentiation (e.g., optimal advertising investments, search and experience goods) and innovation strategies (e.g., protection of intellectual property rights, joint ventures and innovation policies).
- Part A. Optimal Choice and Game Theory. o The Course deals with the foundations of individual and strategic decisions in Economics. The first part covers the determinants of the single agent’s rational choice under different scenarios: the optimal individual choice under full information, under uncertainty and in the context of agency theory (the design of an optimal contract in a principal – agent model with applications to the insurance and labor markets). The second part presents the optimal behavior in a strategic context, dealing with the main applications of Game Theory to Economics. Static and Dynamic Games under complete and incomplete information are investigated, with different solution concepts (iterated dominance, Nash equilibrium, refinements of Nash equilibrium) and applications to firms behavior in oligopolistic markets. - Part B. Firms Strategic Behavior o The Course analyzes the strategies that firms with market power may adopt in order to maximize the returns on business investments. The topics range from pricing decisions (consumers’ discrimination, bundling and tie-in-sales), to firms’ leadership, anti-competitive behavior (collusion, entry deterrence and firms’ mergers and/or acquisitions) and antitrust economics. Non price base competition is also investigated, with application to vertical relation between firms (e.g., manufacturers’ and retailers’ contracts), advertising and product differentiation (e.g., optimal advertising investments, search and experience goods) and innovation strategies (e.g., protection of intellectual property rights, joint ventures and innovation policies).
Testo di riferimento 1:
Course text 1:
Snyder, Nicholson, Microeconomic Theory: Basic principles and extensions, 10th International Edition, South Western Cengage Learning (pagine/pages: 700)
Testo di riferimento 2:
Course text 2:
Pepall, Richard, Norman, Industrial organization, 4th Edition, Blackwell (pagine/pages: 675)
Metodi didattici:
Teaching activities:
Classes and tutorials
Classes and tutorials
Struttura della verifica del profitto:
Assessment:
scritto
written
Descrizione verifica del profitto:
The evaluation of the course is composed by the grade obtained in the written exam at the end of the semester and the grade obtained in seminar presentation (4 points) and in assignments (4 points).
The evaluation of the course is composed by the grade obtained in the written exam at the end of the semester and the grade obtained in seminar presentation (4 points) and in assignments (4 points).
Lingua di insegnamento:
Teaching language:
English
English
Altre informazioni:
Other information:
 
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